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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.cyut.edu.tw:8080/handle/310901800/10066


    Title: A Strategic Conetary Analysis of International Macroeconimic Policy Coordination
    Authors: 魏清圳
    Ching Chun Wei
    Contributors: 財務金融系
    Keywords: 外部性;靜態賽局理論;柏拉圖均衡
    spillover;Cournot-Nash;Stackelberg;Cooperative;monetary policy
    Date: 2001-06
    Issue Date: 2011-01-25 14:41:21 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: Macroeconomic policies of individual countries with open economies have the potential to generate significant economic "spillover" effects abroad. For example, the implementation of an expansionary monetary policy by one country may not have the desired effect(s) if simultaneous changes in monetary policies are made by other countries. This paper combines the basic elements of the Canzoneri and Gray (1985) model and the Frankel and Rockett(1988) model by considering how, certain target variables will react to changes in monetary policy between any two countries under monetary policy coordination. Using static game theory, welfare gains are derived using the Cournot-Nash, Stackelberg and Cooperative equilibrium models. In addition, the effects of changes in the money supply on macroeconomic variables will be examined. This paper concluded that the equilibrium Nash solution suggests that if the game is non-cooperative, where each agent is pursuing his own interest. If the game is cooperative, both players will fully exploit the gains and reach the pareto-optimal equilibrium. Next, the effect of an expansionary monetary policy on the price level display a positive impact on the Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg, but its effect is ambiguous under Cooperation. Finally, the magnitude and welfare effect analysis stated that a larger effect under Cooperation than Non-Cooperation.
    Relation: 朝陽學報,6,p.295-318
    The Journal of Chaoyang University of Technology,6,p.295-318
    Appears in Collections:[秘書處] 朝陽學報

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