運用縱橫門檻迴歸模型於控制股權結構對公司價值之探討

Chaoyang University of Technology Institutional Repository > 管理學院 > 會計系 > 博碩士論文 > Item 310901800/24933

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.cyut.edu.tw:8080/handle/310901800/24933

Title:	運用縱橫門檻迴歸模型於控制股權結構對公司價值之探討 An application of panel threshold regression to the study of ultimate ownership structures on the firm value
Authors:	林海齡 Lin, Hai-Ling
Contributors:	會計所林鳳麗 Feng-Li Lin
Keywords:	現金流量權;公司價值;最終控制者;縱橫門檻迴歸模型 Panel threshold effects;Tobin''''s Q;Ultimate owner;Cash-flow rights
Date:	2008-12-31
Issue Date:	2015-11-06 15:43:07 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	隨著力霸案爆發所影響的社會經濟層面，投資人如何避免成為最終控制者掠奪行為下的犧牲者，究竟最終控制者之股權結構對於公司價值的影響是否存在努力經營的正誘因效果和財富剝奪的負侵占效果的轉折點？本研究以1997年至2006年之242家台灣股票上市公司為研究對象，樣本型態為兼具時間序列及橫斷面資料之平衡式縱橫資料(balanced panel data)，並採用Hansen(1999)所提出之縱橫門檻迴歸模型(panel threshold regression model)，以Tobin''s Q作為公司價值的代理變數，企圖以更精確有效之方式檢測最終控制者之股權結構對公司價值是否存在上下不對稱之門檻效果。本研究結果顯示：(1)現金流量權對於公司價值僅存在單一門檻的正誘因效果，公司價值先是急速增加而後趨於和緩，顯示最終控制者和小股東利益趨於一致，能致力於股東財富極大化進而提升公司價值。(2)股份控制權對於公司價值則存在三個門檻效果，公司價值先是嚴重減少（負侵占效果），而後逐漸增加（正誘因效果），顯示當控制持股過低時，由於經營決策無效率將嚴重損害公司價值；而當控制持股達0.96%以上時，最終控制者能有效經營公司以減輕代理衝突。(3)現金流量權佔股份控制權的比率則存在雙重門檻效果，越接近於一股一權的正誘因效果僅存在72.11%以上，顯示股權結構的改變亦會造成對公司價值不同程度的影響。 This paper analyzes whether ultimate ownership structures affect firm value and uses balanced panel data of 242 Taiwanese listed companies for the year 1997 to 2006. We employ an advanced panel threshold regression model to test whether there is Incentive Effect or Entrenchment Effect which causes there to be threshold effects and asymmetrical relationships between ultimate ownership structures and firm value. We adopt Tobin''s Q as proxy for firm value. Our results indicate that there is only single threshold effect between cash-flow rights and firm value, which is 27.8%. The positive incentive effect between cash-flow rights and firm value generates an increasingly progressive impact with slower speed while cash-flow rights exceed threshold values. There are triple threshold effects between control rights and firm value, which are 0.96%, 32.34%, and 34.03%. When control rights are less than 0.96%, it will lead to operational inefficiencies and lower firm value (negative entrenchment effect); on the contrary, when control rights are larger than 0.96, ultimate owners will engage in managing company efficiently and mitigate the agency conflicts (positive incentives effect). There is a double threshold effect between the ratio of cash-flow rights to control rights and firm value, which are 72.11% and 73.91%, respectively. But the relationship between the ratio of cash-flow rights to control rights and Tobin''s Q varies with different changes in the extent of divergence in cash-flow and control rights, only existence in the ratio larger than 72.11%.
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